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Abstract: The invisible hand theorem relates nothing about the attributes of the optimal
allocation vector.  In this paper, we identify a convex cone of functions such that order on vectors
of exogenous heterogeneity parameters induces component-wise order on allocation vectors for
firms in an efficient market.  By use of functional analysis, we then replace the vectors of
heterogeneities with asymmetries in function attributes such that the induced component-wise
order on efficient allocations still pertains.  We do so through integration over a kernel in which
the requisite asymmetries are embedded.  Likelihood ratio order on the measures of integration is
both necessary and sufficient to ensure component-wise order on efficient factor allocations
across firms.  Upon specializing to supermodular functions, familiar stochastic dominance orders
on normalized measures of integration provide necessary and sufficient conditions for this
component-wise order on efficient allocation.  The analysis engaged in throughout the paper is
ordinal in the sense that all conclusions drawn are robust to monotone transformations of the
arguments in production. 
Keywords: arrangement monotone, functional analysis, market structure, ordinal analysis,            
                    simplex, symmetry
JEL classification: D2, C6, L11.  Introduction
Recent years have seen much success in developing an understanding of how optimizing
firms respond to a change in the economic environment.  Of particular significance has been the
body of work by Topkis (1978), Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1996), Milgrom and
Shannon (1994), and Athey (2000) on the optimal behavior of firms when choice variables and 
environmental parameters take values on lattice or allied algebraic structures.  Appealing aspects
of this suite of methods include the facility with which it accommodates vector valued decision
variables and environmental parameters, and also the generality of the functional forms to which
it applies.
If the comparative statics of decision vectors are of interest to economists, then the level
vectors should also be of interest.  As an example, let two optimizing firms produce a single
homogeneous good.  If firm A uses more labor than firm B then will the technology also require
that firm A also use more capital than firm B?  Little is known about the classes of functions that
impose a certain order on the optimum level vectors of factors used by firms in a market.  The
question should be of importance in understanding both industry structure and the determinants
of comparative performance within an industry.  It should also be of importance as a foundation
in identifying the rents that accrue to factors in production.
The intent of this paper is to establish conditions under which discernible order on the
heterogeneities among firms maps into discernible order on the decisions that these firms would
make in an efficient equilibrium.  The issue addressed, and also the approach taken, is closest to
the assortative matching literature due to Becker (1973).  In his model, couples match off in the
marriage market in a manner that maximizes aggregate household production.  If male and
female productivity types can be totally ordered in a single dimension and if the household
production technology is supermodular, then efficient sorting will involve high types matching
with high types and low with low.  Kremer (1993) and Lazear (2001) have applied assortative
matching to understand equilibrium production structures and surplus distribution, while Shimer
and Smith (2000) have studied the robustness of assortative matching under search frictions.  In2
each of these models, however, quite specific functional structures are assumed, while the
dimensionality of the functions is low.  This paper will provide a general framework for
considering the matching of factors in production in the absence of frictions.
In the first main section, Section 2, we will explain a pre-ordering, as well as the associated
class of functions, that is tailored to elicit order on decision vectors in an efficient equilibrium. 
In the class of functions, which go under the label ‘multivariate arrangement increasing’ or MAI,
heterogeneities among firms are parameterized as vectors.  The class contains the Schur-concave
functions when arguments sum.  It also contains functions that may be represented as the sum of
evaluations of a supermodular function, as well as functions that may be represented as the
product of eveluations of a log-supermodular function.  As with the lattice theory of
optimization, our approach is analytically robust in that it requires no assumptions concerning
concavity, differentiability, or even continuity.  Further, it is particularly well-suited to resource-
constrained allocation problems such as the type of problem one would hope that a decentralized
market solves.  But the approach also has much to relate about agent-level decisions such as
portfolio allocation or the allocation of time across opportunities.
In the second main section, we extend the analysis to identify a class of non-parametric
functions for which the insights of Section 2 pertain.  This is done by building embedded
structural asymmetries into the multivariate function such that order on analytic properties of the
function map into order on the vectors of decisions that are supported in an efficient equilibrium. 
The line of approach is a linear functional analysis of convex cones in the manner of Athey’s
(2000) study of comparative statics under uncertainty, but in quite a different context and with
some distinguishing features.  Her use of linear functionals has the end of developing a robust
framework for identifying comparative statics inferences under stochastic dominance
innovations.  Our use has the end of providing a robust approach to ‘building’ structural
asymmetries into multivariate deterministic functions.  One distinguishing feature pertains to the
use of separating hyperplanes.  Whereas in her analysis the concern is with identifying the    
1 As such, our approach has much in common with the theory of building mathematical objects from
fundamental regions through reflection group operations.  Benson and Grove (1971) present the
foundations of this topic, while Ronan (1989) provides a more specialized treatment. 
    
2 As will become apparent, the nature of the theory to be developed implies that the levels of stock
endowments are of no analytical importance.
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existence of a separating hyperplane, in our study symmetry considerations place restrictions on
the sort of separating hyperplane at issue.  As we seek to rank efficient factor choices across
firms, bisectors in the allocation simplex assume particular importance.  Reflections through
these bisectors are used to construct asymmetries in the multivariate function.  The asymmetries
arise because the replications of a ‘fundamental’ reference region in the factor domain are
imperfect.
1
The final main section focuses on the supermodular sub-class of MAI functions.  We
suppose that aggregate production in a market can be represented as the linear sum of
productions across heterogeneous firms where the heterogeneities are arguments in the common
production technology and where production is supermodular in factors.  We then show how,
after a normalization, univariate and multivariate dominance partial orderings on sources of
heterogeneities across firms map into order in efficient factor allocations across firms.  The
approach taken establishes the strong analogies between our theory of efficient allocation in
equilibrium and the theory of comparative statics.  The paper concludes with a discussion on
open research issues.
2.  Arrangement monotonicity
Our interest is in asymmetries across arguments of a function such that determinate
implications for the efficient allocation of fixed stocks of resources can be deduced.  There are n
active firms in a market where each firm produces a single homogeneous good.  The market’s
resource stocks are given by the array   where  X ' {P x1,P x2,...,P xr} 0 (ún)
r
P xi·P 1 ' ¯ Xi œ i 0 Ωr '
 and where each   is a constant.
2  Each vector  , describes how the i
th {1,2,...,r} ¯ Xi P xi, i 0 Ωr4














resource is allocated across the n firms.  The array is denoted as the allocation array where each
row is a firm’s decision vector.  The j
th coordinate in the vector   is identified as   where the P xi xi,j
array entry represents the j
th firm’s utilization of the i
th resource.  The origin of heterogeneities is
in the array  , which is called the character array.  The economic Θ ' {P θ1,P θ2,...,P θs} 0 (ún)
s
distinction between the arrays is that whereas each  , may vary on the simplex  P xi, i 0 Ωr P xi·P 1 ' ¯ Xi
, the character array is exogenous to decisions made in the market.  The concatenated œ xi $ 0
array   is labeled the market array. Y ' X:Θ
To illustrate, for   let  n ' 3
with 
Read horizontally, the array data is firm-specific.  The j
th firm’s decision and character vectors
are given by   and  , respectively.  For example, firm 2 has character vector  P x(j) P θ(j) P θ(2) '
 and decision vector  .  Read vertically, the array data is either a resource (3,0,4,2) P x(2) ' (4,1)
allocation profile across firms (the first two columns) or a character profile across firms.
Our immediate concern is with how, in an efficient market, arrays   and   relate.  It X Θ
transpires that the multivariate arrangement increasing order on   elicits a form of order on  Θ X
when the available production technology is of a certain structure.  For vector  , define   as P x P x8
the rearrangement of   such that the k
th smallest among the ordinate values is the k
th ordinate.  P x
Thus, if   then  .  The following concept is a variant by Kim and P x ' (3,2.5,4)) P x8 ' (2.5,3,4))    
3 The concept of multivariate arrangement increasing is a generalization of a bivariate ordering due to
Hollander, Proschan, and Sethuraman (1977).  Technically, the order is a pre-ordering rather than a
partial ordering because anti-symmetry only holds up to a vector permutation.  But the distinction is of no
consequence in our analysis because symmetry will allow us to treat vector permutations as being
identical.
5
Proschan (1995) of a definition by Boland and Proschan (1988):
3
Definition 2.1.  For a given pair of vectors with n-dimensional vector arguments {P x1,P x2,...,P xw}
and  , define     if there {P z1,P z2,...,P zw} 0ú n×ún×...×ún ' (ún)
w
{P x1,P x2,...,P xw} '
a {P z1,P z2,...,P zw}
exists a permutation B of   such that  (1,2, ... ,n) P xkπ ' {xkπ(1),xkπ(2),...,xkπ(n)}) ' {zk1,zk2,...,zkn})
 for each  .  Define   if and only if there exists a ' P zk k ' 1,2, ... ,w {P x1,P x2,...,P xw} #
a {P z1,P z2,...,P zw}














(a)   and  , and {P x1,P x2,...,P xw} '
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(b) for each   there exists a pair of coordinate indices, c and d with  , such j ' 1,2, ... ,tc < d









coordinates of every vector   such that   where   is the v









 (such an operation of obtaining   from   is said to be a P y
j&1









basic rearrangement).  If  , then we say that   is larger in X ' {P x1,P x2,...,P xw} #
a {P z1,P z2,...,P zw} ' Z Z
the multivariate arrangement increasing order than  . X
Example 2.1.  For   as given in (2.1), note that   is in increasing order when read Θ P θ1 ' (2,3,4))
from top to bottom.  This is not, however, true of  ,  , or    .  P θ2 ' (1,0,2)) P θ3 ' (3,4,1)) P θ4 ' (3,2,1))
Notice, though, that the first two arguments of   are aligned with the corresponding arguments P θ1
of  , i.e,  .  To align all of the first two arguments up across all of the four P θ3 (2&3)(3&4 )>0
character dimensions, transpose the 1 with the 0 in   and transpose the 3 with the 2 in   to P θ2 P θ4
obtain     
















The array is still not perfectly aligned because the 2
nd and 3
rd arguments in the columns for
 and   do not align with those in the columns for   and  .  That is,  , P θ3 P θ4 P θ1 P θ2 (3&4)(4&1 )<0
,  , and  .  Two more sets of transpositions will (3&4)(3&1 )<0 ( 1&2)(4&1 )<0 ( 1&2)(3&1 )<0
exhaust all opportunities to improve alignment.  Specifically,   where  Θ1 6 Θ2 6 Θ3
When all opportunities to transpose in a manner that increases the arrangement pre-order have
been exhausted, as in  , then the array is said to be maximally arranged.
4 Θ3
To best explain the order, and how it relates to other concepts of order, we pose the
definition in an alternative manner:




a {P x c
1,P x c
2,...,P x c
w}{ P x b
i ,P x b
j } #
a {P x c
i ,P x c
j } œ (i,j) 0
. Ωw×Ωw, i … j
 
All proofs have been placed in the Appendix.  As we will shortly show, it is not a
coincidence that this pair-wise presentation of the definition bears a striking resemblance with a
description of the supermodularity property.  Milgrom and Roberts (1990, Theorem 2) have
demonstrated that a multivariate function where all second-order cross-derivatives exist    
5 Alternatively, we could have studied only functions that are strictly monotone in the MAI order.  Or a
set concept of optimality could have been introduced in the manner of Veinott’s strong set order
(Milgrom and Shannon 1994).
7
everywhere is supermodular if and only if all these derivatives are (weakly) positive on the
domain of support.
The form of production technology that is monotone under the MAI order is given as 
Definition 2.2.  A function   is said to be (weakly) multivariate arrangement g(Z):(ún)
w
6ú
increasing (decreasing) if   whenever  . g(X) #($) g(Z) X #
a Z
Multivariate arrangement increasing (decreasing) functions are said to be MAI (MAD)
functions.  A member of the set of MAI (MAD) functions may be denoted as g(@) 0 MAI
.  Of course, the negative of an MAI function is MAD. (MAD)
Since Definition 2.2 asserts that the MAI order induces a weak improvement in the function
value, the function may have a common value over a set of partially ordered array arrangements. 
Thus, any optimum allocation should be viewed as a set that may not be a singleton.  To reduce
repetition of qualifiers concerning inferences that will be drawn about efficient factor allocations,
we make
5 
Assumption 2.1.  Among the partially ordered arrangements that support equal values of
economic surplus, only the largest in the MAI order will be considered.
Some examples of MAI functions will provide a sense of why the attribute should be of
interest to economists.
Example 2.2.  Schur-concave functions of the form     
6 Supermodular functions are formally defined in Section 4.
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i'1xi,n 0 MAD. (2.5)
F(X) ' F(P x1,P x2,...,P xw) ' j
n




Here X is a cross product of simplices on the intervals of positive real numbers, X ' {P x1,...,P xw}
. This functional specification has been employed by 0 ×
w




j'1xi,j ' ¯ Xi œ i 0 Ωw}
Atkinson (1970) in his seminal work on income distribution, and also by Chambers and Quiggin
(2000) in their studies of the firm under uncertainty.
Example 2.3.  When   is supermodular, then the sum
6 g(·):ún 6ú
Since the property ‘increasing’ is ordinal, if   is log-supermodular, it follows from g(·):úw 6ú %
(2.6) that the product 
is MAI.




 where   is any of the   permutations of the vector arguments.  In our F(P x1,P x2,...,P xw) œ ππ n!
context, this means that how the firms are labeled is irrelevant.
Example 2.4.  In this example, and in contrast to much of the paper’s content, we study the
decision of an individual.  The issue is decision-making under uncertainty, and we will use the
MAI concept to model a multivariate distribution.  The risk averse individual allocates a fixed
stock of her wealth across investment opportunities.  The dimensionality of the heterogeneities is
given by the w states of nature, and the arrangement order at issue concerns how asset returns in a9
‹(P αb











given state are ordered.  Also in contrast with the remainder of this paper, the inference drawn in
this example pertains to welfare rather than allocation.  The asset portfolio holder allocates $1
wealth among n assets with the objective of maximizing a function that is linear in the first two
moments of portfolio returns.  The return on the i
th asset,  , is given by   where each i 0 Ωn P θ
b
i 0ú w
of the w states is equiprobable.  The multivariate distribution may be represented as the array Θb










on the simplex  .  Allocation to the i
th asset in the optimal vector is identified as {P α 0ú
n
%: P α·P 1 ' 1}
 under character array  .  The vector of mean returns is given by  , i.e., mean returns αb
(,i Θb P µb ' µP 1
are common, while the coefficient of risk aversion is written as the positive number  .  Expected λ
utility may then be expressed as 
We seek to compare ex-ante investor welfare under   with that under the alternative Θb







then given by  .  This vector is also assumed to be interior on the simplex.  Applying Lemma P αc
(
2.1 to the covariance terms, we have   for  .  Indeed, relation  ‹(P αc
(:Θb) $‹ (P αc
(:Θc)Θ b #
a Θc Θb #
a
 is both necessary and sufficient to infer   when   can assume any (not Θc ‹(P αc
(:Θb) $‹ (P αc
(:Θc) P αc
(
necessarily interior) value on the allocation simplex.  Since   need not be ex-ante optimal under P αc
(
multivariate distribution  , the chain of inequalities can be extended to  Θb ‹(P αb
(:Θb) $‹ (P αc
(:Θb)
 so that the investor has an ex-ante preference for the distribution that is not as well $‹ (P αc
(:Θc)
arranged.  Put simply, multivariate distribution   is possessed of less systemic risk than  . Θb Θc
Example 2.5.  To illustrate the relevance of the order for understanding allocation vectors,
suppose that three firms produce a single good using two inputs and that all three markets are












character vectors as in Example 2.1, and where  .  Observe that the second and third F(·)0 MAI
rows are ordinally aligned in  , i.e.,  , and  .  However, the alignment Θ2 3<4 , 1<2 , 1<4 1<3
does not extend to the allocation array when the market array is  , as given in Equation X0:Θ2
(2.2), because   and  .  Upon invoking Assumption 2.1, market array   cannot 4>2 1>0 X0:Θ2
represent an efficient equilibrium because one can (weakly) increase output by transpositions
 and   to obtain the market array  4 : 21 : 0
These transpositions do not violate any resource constraints because the value   is invariant to P xi@P 1
the order of summation.  Array   cannot represent an efficient equilibrium because an X0:Θ2
alternative position on the cross-product of simplices   dominates it.  Whatever the efficient P x1×P x2
equilibrium is, it is not  . X0:Θ2
To generalize on Example 2.5, commence with an inspection of the character array only,  , Θ
and identify some set of rows (there may be more than one such set of rows) that, by themselves,
are maximally arranged according to Definition 2.1.  Eliminate all other rows so that what
remains is really a sub-array of the character array.  Label the residual reduced array as an aligned
character sub-array (ACsA).  The corresponding market array is called an extended ACsA. 
Absent other conditions, this extended ACsA need not be aligned in all arguments.
As an illustration, and with reference to Example 2.5, for character array   there are two  Θ2





For row pair 2 and 3, when the market array is   then the extended ACsA is  X0:Θ2
As this ACsA is not maximally arranged, it will not arise in an efficient economy.  Whatever the
equilibrium in a first-best allocation, it is not consistent with (2.11).  To formalize, we make
Assumption 2.2.  Allocation is efficient.
In the general setting, the observation concerning induced order in the extended ACsA may
be stated as
Theorem 2.1.  Under assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, if the market production function is MAI then an
extended ACsA in equilibrium must be maximally arranged.
Put another way, if allocation is efficient then the allocation component of the extended ACsA
inherits the order that all ACsAs are constructed to possess. 
Example 2.6.  Upon occasion, a vector of characters will become a decision vector.  Suppose
that firms in a market have been allocated SO2 emissions permits, but cannot trade them, and that
the second column in array (2.11) represents the endowed emissions permits for two firms.  The
character array, now comprised of the five right-most columns in (2.11), is not an ACsA.  If,
however, a market in these permits is legalized, then the second column enters the allocation
component of the extended sub-array rather than the character component and the narrower
character component is an ACsA.  Theorem 2.1 now applies, so that if an allocation is (permit
endowment constrained) efficient then the lower firm (firm 3) will always use more of the first    
7 The authors know of one paper, by Proschan and Leysieffer (1992), that studies MAI functions
(when  ) with tools from functional analysis.  Their concern is with problems in statistical r ' s ' 1
analysis, and their findings do not overlap with ours.  The concept of rank densities that they work with
may, however, be of utility in future studies of economic allocation.
    
8 Throughout, we treat as equivalent all measures that are equal almost everywhere.
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and the second (i.e., permit) factors in production than will the upper firm (firm 2).  That is,
 where vector order relation   is understood to mean the (x1,3,x2,3) ' P x(3) $P x(2) ' (x1,2,x2,2) $
usual coordinate-wise order.  In this example  , and in general   since each firm P x(j) 0 ¯ ú
2
% P x(j) 0 ¯ ú
r
%
uses r factors in production.  This component-wise ordering on factor use across firms will be
referred to as the strong order on factor use.
3.  Representation through measures
Technological heterogeneities are unlikely to present themselves in explicit parametric form. 
To establish the generality of the insights provided by definitions 2.1 and 2.2, we will extend the
theory of MAI functions by constructing non-parametric functions such that the inferences in
Theorem 2.1 remain valid.
7  It has been observed by Marshall and Olkin (1979, p. 162) that
arrangement increasing functions are convex cones.
Definition 3.1. [Aliprantis and Border (1999, p. 180)] Set T is a convex cone if it is convex, and
if   implies   for every  . x 0 T αx 0 T α 0 ¯ ú%
This observation is important because it allows us to view the character parameters in MAI
functions as degenerate measures that may be generalized.  Specifically, instead of   we may Θ
conceive of a continuous, positive, finite measure   on the s character vectors, and G(Θ):(ún)
s
6ú




8     
9 Our proofs involve reflections across a bisector that partitions a fundamental region on the measure’s
support.  This fundamental region is given as   or one of its  permutations.  The θ1 <θ 2 <...<θ n n!
independence assumption, while very useful in modeling reflections across bisectors, is not essential. 
Using an approach in Shanthikumar and Yao (1991), we could also study how dependent measures affect
allocation.  Dependent measures are considerably more difficult to work with, especially for measures
with more than two character arguments.
    





Concerning  , we assume that it has support on  .  Upon suppressing Θ[ θ l,θ u]
n
dú n,θ l <θ u
 in presentation, the function is written as  .  In the functional analysis to G(Θ) H[X]:(ún)
r
6ú
follow, we refer to   as the kernel and   as the multivariate measure.  It is sought to F(X:Θ) G(Θ)
ascertain properties on the measure such that the asymmetries underpinning Theorem 2.1, as it
applies to an MAI kernel, persist in  , i.e., in  . H[X:G(Θ)] H[X]
To facilitate development of the main insights, it will be assumed in the initial analysis that
 so that  .  We will also assume that the measure is comprised of the product of s ' 1Θ ' P θ1
independent measures.
Assumption 3.1.  For  ,   where   is the variable of integration for s ' 1 G(Θ) ' (
n
j'1Gj(θ1,j) θ1,j
 and  each   is a continuously differentiable, positive, finite measure on  Gj(θ1,j) Gj(θ1,j)[ θ l,θ u]
with   and  .  dGj(θ)/dθ ' gj(θ) $ 0 Gj(θl) ' 0
Thus, heterogeneities (i.e., asymmetries) involving interdependence between factor
allocations are expressed only in the kernel.
9  An order relation on (probability) measures that has
proven to be of considerable utility in contract theory and elsewhere in economics is the
monotone likelihood ratio order.
10  It will also prove useful in our study of efficient allocation. 
Definition 3.2.  Under Assumption 3.1, let 14
D3.2 a)   be nondecreasing over the union of the supports of the measures (with  g1(θ)/g2(θ) k/0
ascribed the value 4 whenever  , or equivalently k 0ú%
D3.2 b)   for all  . g1(v)g2(u) $ g1(u)g2(v) v $ u
Then   is said to be larger than   in the likelihood ratio (LR) order, and is denoted by G1(θ) G2(θ)
. G1(θ) $
lr G2(θ)
Notice that while   is required, in contrast with probability measures we do not Gj(θ)$ 0
require that   be common across  .  This makes no difference, however, in Definition 3.2 Gj(θu)Ω n
because properties D3.2 a) and D3.2 b) are scale invariant so that the distinction between a
probability measure and a finite measure is not germane.  Our central result in this section is  
Theorem 3.1.  Under assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 3.1, let   and let   be as given in s ' 1 H[X:G(Θ)]
(3.1).  Then   if and only if . P x(j) $P x(k) œ F(X:Θ)0 MAI Gj(θ) $
lr Gk(θ)
The multivariate measure does admit evaluations of the ‘character parameters’ such that the
kernel would suggest that   is not optimal.  But the   relation across variates in the P x(j) $P x(k) $
lr
multivariate measure ensures that the weightings on these out-turns are more than offset by
weightings on the hidden character parameters such that   is optimal.  To be P x(j) $P x(k)
completely clear about how Theorem 3.1 may be viewed as an extension of Theorem 2.1,
suppose that, up to a permutation of  , the independent univariate measures may be ordered as Ωn




sense on the array   whereby function   replaces the j
th evaluation of the single vector in X:θ1 Gj(θ)
the character array.
Example 3.1.  The subject of analysis need not be an efficient market in which exchange occurs. 
The key supposition, Assumption 2.2, is also satisfied when an efficiently operating market is    




U(P x@P θ1) (
n
i'1dGi(θ1,i), s.t. xi >0œ i 0 Ωn, P x@P 1 ' 1, (3.2)
replaced by a rational individual seeking to optimize the allocation of a finite resource stock,
such as the hours in a day or available wealth.  Landsberger and Meilijson studied the portfolio
allocation problem
where function   is increasing and where the   are now probability measures.  Kernel U(@) Gj(θ)




implies the allocation   follows from Theorem 3.1 above.  x1 $ x2 $ ...$ xn
4.  Supermodular market
Among the sub-classes of MAI functions outlined in examples 2.2 and 2.3, the sub-class that
lends itself most readily to an analysis of efficient equilibrium was given in equation (2.6), i.e.,
the sum of character differentiated supermodular functions.  This should not be surprising given
the strong implications of the supermodularity assumption in the theory of comparative statics. 
Before engaging in a formal analysis of efficient allocation when market-level output can be
represented as in specification (2.6), we will remind the reader of some of the principal technical
features of lattice theory as it applies to optimization.
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Definition 4.1.  A lattice, L, is a set that is closed under two binary operations.  These are the
least upper bound operation   and the greatest lower bound operation  , such that for all º¸
elements   the following postulates are satisfied: i) to every ordered pair   of a, b, c 0 L (a,b)
elements is assigned a unique element   and also a unique element  , ii)   and aºba ¸ba ºb ' bºa
, iii)   and  , iv)   and a¸b ' b¸a (aºb)ºc ' aº(bºc)( a¸b)¸c ' a¸(b¸c) a¸(aºb) ' a
. aº(a¸b) ' a16
Definition 4.2.  Given a lattice L and a partially ordered set T, the function   is h(·):L 6ú
supermodular if for all  .  Function   has a, b 0 L, h(a) % h(b) # h(aºb) % h(a¸b) h(·):L×T 6ú
increasing differences in   if for   is monotone non-decreasing (x,t) 0 L×Tx % $ x, g(x%,t) & g(x,t)
in t where   is the lattice order. $
Milgrom and Shannon (1994) have shown that if   is supermodular on L with h(·):L×T 6ú
increasing differences on   then the set of maximizing arguments on L is monotone non- L×T
decreasing in evaluations of T.  When   is the metric space  , then their result applies to L×T úr%s
any continuously differentiable function such that all   second-order cross- (r%s)(r%s&1)/2
derivatives are positive.  In our study of efficient allocation equilibria, the algebraic structure of
our choice set is the direct product of simplices.  It is readily shown that this direct product is not
a lattice.  Nonetheless, it will be shown that their finding bears striking similarities with the
conclusions that we will draw for the attributes of allocation equilibria when market production
is of the form (2.6).  For the allocation problem and when heterogeneities among firms are
represented through vector arguments, as in Section 2 above, then the MAI pre-order (up to re-
permutations) on the character array provides the partially ordered set, T, of interest.  We seek
now, however, to identify pertinent attributes of partially ordered sets, and the associated
ordering, when the character array has been replaced by a multivariate measure.  That is, we seek
a result in the manner of Theorem 3.1 when the MAI market surplus function has been
specialized to be supermodular.
To formalize the technical environment underpinning the market, we define 
Definition 4.3.  Let the j
th firm’s production function be of the form h(x1,j,...,xr,j:θ1,j,...,θs,j)
where   is supermodular in   and has increasing differences in  .  Then the h(@) P x(j) P x(j),P θ(j)
market is said to be a supermodular market. 17
Notice the additive separability of form (2.6) in factors so that firms do not impose
production externalities on each other, except through the aggregate allocation constraint.  This is
in contrast with an arbitrary Schur-concave function, as given in Example 2.2 above, and it is this
additive separability that makes the supermodular market a particularly convenient form of MAI
market surplus function to work with.
Before developing our results, we need to clarify our notation to identify increasing
differences between allocations and sources of heterogeneity among firms.  Our interest, as in
Athey’s study of stochastic dominance, is in convex cones of functions.  For the moment, we will
confine our attention to the situation where there is just one character argument.  Write   if p1 ' 1
a function is continuously differentiable and (weakly) increasing in that character argument,
 if it is continuously differentiable and decreasing, and   if it is not assumed to p1 '&1 p1 ' 0
possess either property.  Generally, write   if the function’s k
th derivative in the character pk ' 1
argument exists and is uniformly positive,   if it exists and is uniformly negative, and pk '&1
 if it is not assumed to possess either property.  Now write the vector  pk ' 0 P p ' (p1,p2,p3,...)
where the vector terminates at the k
th ordinate whenever  .  Written in this way, pl ' 0 œ l > k
vector   represents a cone of functions where the cone is generated from the function’s analytic P p
properties along one dimension.  Thus,   is understood to represent the cone of twice P p ' (1,&1)
continuously differentiable, increasing and concave functions in one dimension. 
Definition 4.4.  Consider a supermodular market where the firm production technology,  , h(@)
has just one character argument.  Function   is said to possess property   if h(x1,j,...,xr,j:θ1,j) P& P p
. dh(x1,j,...,xr,j:θ1,j)/dxi,j 0P p œ i 0 Ωr, œP x(j) 0 ¯ ú
r
%
Associated with each property   there is a stochastic ordering that increases the expected P p
value of that class of functions.  For example, if  , then the order in question is the P p ' (0,&1)
mean-preserving contraction.  If, instead,   then the order in question is second-degree P p ' (1,&1)18
stochastic dominance.  While the independent univariate measures written in Assumption 3.1 do
not conform to the unit integration requirement of probability measures, a normalization that
arises naturally for supermodular kernels will ensure that they do.  Writing  , ˆ G(θ) / G(θ)/G(θu)
we denote the dominance order relation   whenever  ˆ Gj(θ) $
P&P p ˆ Gk(θ) *
θu
θl h(θ)dGj(θ)/Gj(θu) $
.  This notation is of relevance in our approach to allocation *
θu
θl h(θ)dGk(θ)/Gk(θu) œ h(θ) 0P p
because dominance relations among normalized independent measures provide the partial
ordering that we require to implement a measure generalization of Theorem 2.1 that has been
specialized for a firm-level production function which is supermodular in factors.
Theorem 4.1.  Under assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 3.1, let   and let   be as in (3.1) s ' 1 H[X:G(Θ)]
where the kernel is that for a supermodular market.  Further, suppose that the supermodular
function   has property  .  Then   for all such kernels if and only if  h(@) P& P p P x(j) $P x(k) ˆ Gj(θ) $
P&P p
. ˆ Gk(θ)
Example 4.1.  Let   be supermodular in  .  Then property    h(x1,j,x2,j:θ1,j)( &x1,j,x2,j,θ1,j) ˆ Gj(θ) $
P&(1)
 implies   and  .  If   where   and  ˆ Gk(θ) x2,j $ x2,k x1,j # x1,k ˆ G1(θ) $
P&(1) ˆ G2(θ) $
P&(1)
...$
P&(1) ˆ Gn(θ) x1,j x2,j
are the j
th firm’s respective labor and capital allocations, then the firm’s univariate character
measure,  , may be thought of as an indicator for the firm’s use of technologies that Gj(θ)
substitute capital in for labor.
We close this section by generalizing the character array to contain an arbitrary finite number
of character vectors so that the kernel has   arguments rather than the   arguments studied r%sr %1
in Theorem 4.1.  Suppose that firm-level production for the j
th firm is given by 
 which is supermodular in all arguments.  Extending the measure on h(x1,j,...,xr,j:θ1,j,...,θs,j)
firm characters accordingly, let the possibility of dependence in characters within a firm exist,
but preclude dependence across firms.     
12 Because monotonicity is not imposed on the reference class of functions,  , the supermodular m(@)
order must fix the marginal distributions so that we need not be concerned with the monotonicity status
of    in  . h(@)θ i,j, i 0 Ωs
    
13 See Theorem 2.5 in Müller and Scarsini (2000) or Table 1 in Athey (2000).
19
Assumption 4.1.    where each   is a continuously G(Θ) ' (
n
j'1Gj(θ1,j,...,θs,j) Gj(θ1,j,...,θs,j)
differentiable, positive, finite measure on   with  . [θl,θ u]
s
Gj(θl,...,θl) ' 0 œ j 0 Ωn
With  , the pertinent dominance relation is ˆ Gj(θ1,j,...,θs,j) ' Gj(θ1,j,...,θs,j)/Gj(θu,...,θu)
the supermodular order as defined in Shaked and Shanthikumar (1997).
12
Definition 4.5.  Positive, finite, normalized measure   is said to be larger than ˆ Gj(θ1,j,...,θs,j)
positive, finite, normalized measure   in the supermodular order [and written as ˆ Gk(θ1,k,...,θs,k)
] if  ˆ Gj(θ1,...,θs) $
sm ˆ Gk(θ1,...,θs) *m(θ1,...,θs) d ˆ Gj(θ1,...,θs) $ *m(θ1,...,θs) d ˆ Gk(θ1,...,θs)
for all supermodular functions   for which the integrations exist.  m(θ1,...,θs)
This class of measures is precisely that which induces allocative order across firms when
allocation is efficient.
Theorem 4.2.  Under assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 4.1, let   be as in (3.1) where the H[X:G(Θ)]
kernel is that for a supermodular market.  Suppose too that  , d 3h(@)/dxi,jdθk,jdθl,j $ 0 œ i 0 Ωr
.  Then   whenever  œ (k, l) 0 Ωs×Ωs, k … l P x(u) $P x(v) ˆ Gu(θ1,...,θs) $
sm ˆ Gv(θ1,...,θs), (u,v) 0
. Ωn×Ωn, u … v
Example 4.2.  The indicator product function   is supermodular.  Together with I{θ1$¯ θ1}I{θ2$¯ θ2}
 and  , the function set  , can be used as an infinite &I{θ1$¯ θ1} &I{θ2$¯ θ2} I{θ1$¯ θ1}I{θ2$¯ θ2},( ¯ θ1,¯ θ2) 0ú 2
dimensional basis for constructing arbitrary supermodular kernels in  .
13  Let  ú220








and perform the MAI ordered transposition to 
This increase along the partial ordering weakly increases the value of    '
2
j'1I{θ1,j$¯ θ1}I{θ2,j$¯ θ2} œ
 while the independent univariate measures have not changed.  Let (¯ θ1,¯ θ2) 0ú 2
 satisfy the conditions in Theorem 4.2.  Then, after  , firm 2 in h(x1,j,...,xr,j:θ1,j,...,θs,j)Θ b 6 Θc
an efficient supermodular market will use more of all resources than will firm 1.  The
rearrangement   has acted as a discrete increase in the supermodular order on the bivariate Θb 6 Θc
measure of character variables.  Compared with when it does not apply, the partial order relation
 will tend to concentrate market production toward firm 2 in this example ˆ G2(θ1,θ2) $
sm ˆ G1(θ1,θ2)
since it is generally assumed that a firm’s production will increase in factor use.
Example 4.3.  Suppose that the j
th firm’s supermodular firm-level production
 is transformed to   where h(x1,j,...,xr,j:θ1,j,...,θs,j) h[g1(x1,j),...,gr(xr,j):gr%1(θ1,j),...,gr%s(θs,j)]
each  , is monotone in the same direction.  Then   remains gm(@), m ' 1,2,...,r%sh [@]
supermodular in its original arguments so that Theorem 4.2 continues to apply.  Since the
property ‘monotone’ is ordinal, this example demonstrates the ordinal nature of the approach
taken in this paper.  Returning to Definition 2.1, if each of the w vectors is transformed by the
univariate function   where all w such functions are monotone in the same direction, then gm(@)
order among arrays is preserved.21
5.  Conclusion
The path taken in our theory of efficient resource allocation across firms in an industry
‘builds’ asymmetries into a firm’s production technology through the use of linear functionals. 
The end has been to draw inferences concerning the factor allocations a social planner would
make.  While the underlying algebraic structure of the choice set available to the social planner
differs from that countenanced by the micro-agent in the theory of optimization on a lattice, the
similarities in other regards are marked.  Both frameworks model decisions in an ordinal manner. 
Partly as a consequence, in both frameworks the typical regularity assumptions of
differentiability, convexity, and even continuity may be dispensed with.  Supermodular functions
play an important role in both approaches, although in neither case are supermodular functions
the most general functions for which the respective theory applies.  Most importantly, both are, in
one form or another, applications of separating hyperplane results.  It would seem then that the
analyst seeking an integrated theory of optimal economic choices in equilibrium might first turn
to convex analysis.
Unfortunately, the theory of MAI functions has not developed far beyond the initial inquiry
of Hollander, Proschan, and Sethuraman (1977) and the later multivariate extension due to
Boland and Proschan (1988).  It is the opinion of the authors that a systematic development of
classes of functions with built-in structural asymmetries will shed light on a variety of economic
problems.  In the international trade literature, for example, it would seem that comparative
advantage may be represented as an asymmetry in the available technologies.  The theory of
comparative advantage, however, involves trade in two or more goods.  A remarkable feature of
our single market model is that we could ignore price effects in output markets.  This is due, at
least in part, to the fact that our theory relates nothing about cardinal measures of factor use since
factors may flow out of the studied output market.  While our results remain valid in an efficient
general equilibrium, an inquiry into the consequences of technical asymmetries for relative factor
and product prices in general equilibrium would necessitate a more robust framework in which to22
model the asymmetries.  Output price effects would also have to be accommodated in a single
market where firms have some market power.  Perhaps the most immediate extension of this
ordinal approach would involve the treatment of production externalities.  In particular, how do
production externalities affect the divergence between efficient equilibria and market-supported
equilibria?23
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.1.  We will demonstrate the forward implication first.  The definition of
multivariate arrangement order in the sense of   requires that, when comparing a pair of #
a
coordinates across every vector in an array, they can only be transposed if the transposition
increases their alignment with an arbitrarily chosen reference ‘base’ vector.  In particular, let the
base vector be  .  Then an increase in the multivariate   order requires that, when comparing a P x b
i #
a
pair of coordinates across vector  , the pair can only be transposed if the transposition increases P x b
j
the vector’s alignment with vector  .  Because   and   are distinct vectors chosen arbitrarily P x b
i P x b
i P x b
j
among  , the forward implication must hold. P x b
k , k 0 Ωw
Now suppose that   does not imply {P x b
i ,P x b
j } #
a {P x c
i ,P x c
j } œ (i,j) 0 Ωw×Ωw, i … j




a {P x c
1,P x c
2,...,P x c
w}( i,j) 0 Ωw×Ωw, i … j
array of vectors such that   does not adhere when    {P x b
i ,P x b
j } #
a {P x c
i ,P x c

















Proof of Theorem 3.1.  The line of approach is the extension of a symmetry argument that has
been used in the probability order literature by, for example, Shanthikumar and Yao (1991) and
elsewhere in economics and finance (see Kijima and Ohnishi 1996, or Lapan and Hennessy
2001).  The proof proceeds in three steps.  The first clarifies the relevance of Theorem 2.1 to the
analysis.  The second proves that   implies   for all MAI kernels.  The Gj(θ) $
lr Gk(θ) P x(j) $P x(k)
third proves that if   is not true then there exists an MAI kernel such that the strong Gj(θ) $
lr Gk(θ)
set order on factor use   is not true.   P x(j) $P x(k)
Step 1: We seek a concept of total order,  , in the sense that if  , then $
( Gj(θ) $
( Gk(θ)
efficiency requires that  .  Because the kernel is MAI and the character array is a P x(j) $P x(k)
vector, we can readily appeal to the finding in Theorem 2.1 for intuition.  That is, if θ1,j $ θ1,k
then, in the parametric case of Theorem 2.1, under efficiency it must be that  .  P x(j) $P x(k)27












[F(X:Θ) & F(X:Θτ)][dG(Θτ) & dG(Θ)]
'
m θ1,k$θ1,j









Alternatively, if   then, in the parametric case, it must be that  .  In either case, θ1,j # θ1,k P x(j) #P x(k)
and ignoring firms other than the j
th and k
th, the efficient allocation will be maximally arranged. 
Independence (i.e., Assumption 3.1) in measure allows us to consider just two firms.  The steps
to follow will show that   is precisely the order property on a pair of positive, finite, univariate $
lr
measures such that the measures act as if they were a point in  . ú2
Step 2: Now consider  , written as  H[X:G(Θ)]
.  Interchange the j
th and k
th H[X:G1(θ1,1)×G2(θ1,2)×...×Gj(θ1,j)×...×Gk(θ1,k)×...×Gn(θ1,n)]
evaluations in the character vector to obtain 
.  To abbreviate, write the H[X:G1(θ1,1)×G2(θ1,2)×...×Gj(θ1,k)×...×Gk(θ1,j)×...×Gn(θ1,n)]
latter as   where the subscripted   is understood to represent the transposition of H[X:G(Θτ)] τ
parameter evaluations.  Using the fact that variables of integration are just placeholders, it is
readily shown that the difference between integrals can be written as
where the continuous differentiability of the finite measures allows us to double count the
evaluation  .  From step A,   ensures that the first part of the integrand θ1,j ' θ1,k F(X:Θ)0 MAI
after the final equality is negative when  .  From Definition 3.2, the second part of that P x(j) $P x(k)
integrand is positive when  .  Then  .  Alternatively, Gj(θ) $
lr Gk(θ) H[X:G(Θτ)] # H[X:G(Θ)]
observe that the rows in the market array may be interchanged so that what matters is how a
firm’s decision vector matches its character vector.  Therefore, if (A.1) is true then we may write28







h[P x(j):θ] dGj(θ) % Gj(θu)
m
h[P x(k):θ] dGk(θ) (A.3)
 where   represents allocation array   but where the j
th and k
th firms H[Xτ:G(Θ)] # H[X:G(Θ)] Xτ X
interchange their decision vectors.  Thus, with  , efficiency requires that  . Gj(θ) $
lr Gk(θ) P x(j) $P x(k)
Step 3: Suppose that   is not true on an interval of strictly positive Lebesgue Gj(θ) $
lr Gk(θ)
measure,  , satisfying  .  We will proceed by constructing a violation on a particular L θ1,j $ θ1,k
extreme point of the cone of MAI functions.  In particular, let   on interval  F(X:Θ)' 1
, T[ˆ θ1,j,∆θ1,j,ˆ θ1,k,∆θ1,k] ' {(θ1,j,θ1,k): ˆ θ1,j # θ1,j # ˆ θ1,j % ∆θ1,j,ˆ θ1,k & ∆θ1,k # θ1,k # ˆ θ1,k,∆ θ 1,j >0
 and let   otherwise.  Here, ∆θ1,k >0,ˆ θ1,j > ˆ θ1,k} œ θt 0 [θl,θu], t ó {i,j}, œP x(j) $P x(k) F(X:Θ)' 0
the set bounds are chosen such that  .  By L ' X×[ˆ θ1,j,ˆ θ1,j%∆θ1,j]×[ˆ θ1,k&∆θ1,k,ˆ θ1,k]×[θl,θu]
s&2
construction,  .  Now, in the context of (A.1), take   to F(X:Θ)0 MAI Lim∆θ1,j60,∆θ1,k60 F(X:Θ)
obtain
when  .  Clearly, while this   is MAI the difference in expression (A.1) is P x(j) $P x(k) F(X:Θ)
strictly positive when  .  Then any allocation other than those satisfying  P x(j) $P x(k) P x(j) $P x(k)
will be supported in the market.  Thus,   is also necessary for the allocation Gj(θ) $
lr Gk(θ)
inference to be valid for all MAI functions. ~
Proof of Theorem 4.1.  Again, independence allows us to confine the analysis to two firms.  We
seek conditions under which we can apply Theorem 2.1, but where the character parameters are
functions rather than scalars.  We seek a partial ordering of   with respect to   such that, Gj(θ) Gk(θ)
if the measures are so ordered, the expression 
cannot be improved upon through re-allocations of factors across firms.  Upon division, we
require that 29
m
h[P x(j):θ] d ˆ Gj(θ) %
m
h[P x(k):θ] d ˆ Gk(θ) (A.4)
V[P x(j):γj] '
m
h[P x(j):θ] d ˆ Gj(θ), (A.5)
cannot be improved upon.
The linear functionals can be re-parameterized so that supermodularity is preserved in a
functional sense.  Write 
where   indexes, in ascending order, a chain in the dominance order of interest.  Thus, by γ 0ú
definition,   if and only if  .  We know from Definition 4.4, the fact that ˆ Gj(θ) $
P&P p ˆ Gk(θ) γj $ γk
monotonicity is preserved under integration with respect to a positive measure, and use of an
interchange in the order of differentiation, that   is monotone non- V[P x(j):γj] & V[P x(j):γk]
decreasing in each factor whenever  .  Applying Theorem 2.1, we have the true assertion: γj $ γk
when   then it must be that   if (A.4) cannot be improved upon.  As usual, the γj $ γk P x(j) $P x(k)
converse can be demonstrated by picking out extreme points on the cone of functions. ~
Proof of Theorem 4.2.  From the conditions in the Theorem, we know that   is dh(@)/dxi,j
supermodular in   for each  .  From Definition 4.5, if the supermodular partial order is P θ(j) i 0 Ωr
parameterized by scalar   so that   whenever the function partial ordering    γγ u $ γv ˆ Gu(θ1,...,θs) $
sm
 is true then   is ˆ Gv(θ1,...,θs) V[P x(u):γu] ' *h(x1,u,...,xr,u:θ1,...,θs) dGu(θ1,...,θs)
supermodular in  .  The result then follows from applying Theorem 2.1. ~ (x1,...,xr,γu)